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Abstract 
This paper examines the relative share pricing of 98 firms with two classes of common stock 
trading in the United States from 1984 to 1999.  The firms feature common stock classes with 
differential voting rights and, in some cases, differential rights to dividends.  The observed 
voting premiums are higher than those reported in previous studies of U.S. firms and are 
dependent on the form of dividend promise to the low-vote shareholder. The voting premium is 
higher in the presence of a control threat, when insiders do not hold controlling voting power, 
and during periods of poor firm performance.  
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THE SOURCE OF VALUE OF VOTING RIGHTS  
AND RELATED DIVIDEND PROMISES 
 
1. Introduction: 
 Common stock ownership generally provides a claim to residual cash flows and the right 
to control the corporation by voting on certain issues.  The relative value of these two 
ownership benefits is difficult to determine because they are typically bundled together in each 
share of common stock.  However, some firms have separated the rights to cash flows and 
voting power by adopting dual-class common stock.  Typically, a second class of common stock 
is created with limited voting rights and, in some cases, a preferred claim to dividends.  The 
high-vote stock receives multiple votes per share and/or the ability to elect the majority of the 
board of directors while the low-vote stock typically receives one vote per share and/or the 
ability to elect a minority of the board of directors.  In some cases the low-vote stock is 
nonvoting.  Firms with dual-class stock with disparate voting rights provide a unique 
opportunity to measure the value of control over a firm’s activities.     
 Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983) study 30 U.S. firms with two classes of 
common stock trading from 1940 to 1978 and find that the stock class with superior voting 
rights trades at an average premium of 5.4%.  Zingales (1995) finds a mean voting premium of 
10.5% in a study of 94 U.S. firms between 1984 and 1990.  Megginson (1990) studies 152 dual-
class British firms from 1955 to 1982 and finds that high-vote shares trade at a 13.3% premium 
over low-vote shares.  Rydqvist (1996) finds a 12% average premium in Sweden, Chung and 
Kim (1999) find a 9.6% average premium in Korea, and Levy (1982) finds that high-vote shares 
trade at a 45% average premium in a study of Israeli firms. 
 In order for high-vote shares to trade at a higher price than low-vote shares, finance 
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theory indicates that the high-vote shares must carry the expectation of benefits that low-vote 
shares do not.  Thus, evidence that common stock with superior voting rights trades at a higher 
price than otherwise identical stock implies at least the possibility of differential cash or non-cash 
payoffs to the two classes.  The source of these potential differential payoffs remains an 
unsettled issue.   
 One explanation is that owners of high-vote stock, who are often also managers or 
directors, receive direct benefit from voting control by ensuring a long-run relationship with 
their firm.  The benefits range from the non-pecuniary (such as power, recognition, and a nice 
office) to the cash value of a guaranteed salary.  Although this is a persuasive explanation of the 
source of the premiums, it does not directly explain why control premiums persist in equilibrium 
after insiders hold controlling power. 
 The market price of common stock should reflect the supply and demand of the marginal 
shareholders who are actively trading.  While insiders clearly have incentive to prefer the high-
vote shares, once they have secured their position in the firm they are unlikely to be active 
traders of their company’s stock.  As a result, the active traders in the high-vote stock will 
typically be non-insiders who are unlikely to qualify for the direct extraction of the benefits of 
corporate control.  Thus, the observed premiums may reflect more than just the value of private 
benefits to entrenched insiders. 
 If the benefit of direct corporate control by insiders does not provide motivation for 
marginal shareholders to pay a premium for high-vote shares, then alternative explanations are 
needed.  Two indirect benefits of corporate control for non-insiders are explored in this paper.  
First, non-insiders may be willing to pay a premium for high-vote stock as an option to 
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participate in possible premiums paid to the high-vote shares in the event of a corporate 
takeover.  DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) document that 40% of the acquisitions of dual-class 
firms from 1960 to 1980 included negotiated premiums to the high-vote shares.  The premiums 
ranged from 83.3% to 200%.  Megginson reports that 43 out of 152 British dual-class firms 
were acquired between 1955-1982.  Of the 43 successful acquisitions, 37 included preferential 
offers to high-vote shareholders.  The existence of differential takeover premiums suggests an 
explanation for long-lived control premiums.  Outside shareholders who never intend to utilize 
direct control may still pay a premium for high-vote shares as an investment strategy.   
 A second possibility of a non-direct benefit of corporate control occurs when a firm’s 
performance slips and significant outside shareholders, such as fund managers or coalitions of 
individual investors, feel the need to exert pressure on management to boost performance.  If a 
firm performs satisfactorily, then the ability to influence corporate decision-making may be of 
limited value.  However, when profitability declines, non-insiders may place greater value on the 
vote as a temporary disciplinary device to improve the firm’s cash flows.  These non-insiders 
may have no interest in initiating a takeover or in becoming an insider, but simply value having a 
voice in how the business is run.   Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) suggest that the premium of 
voting over nonvoting shares represents the ‘opportunity of those with votes to improve the 
performance of the corporation.”  Feldman (2000) describes a rise in shareholder activism and 
the increased power of individual investors to pressure for improved performance through 
collaboration on the Internet.   
 Many firms with dual-class common stock promise preferential dividends to the low-vote 
shareholders to encourage outside shareholder approval of the dual-class recapitalizations and to 
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encourage conversion of high-vote shares to low-vote shares.  Dual-class stock with disparate 
voting rights provides an opportunity for shareholders who place a low value on corporate 
control to sell their votes to shareholders who place a higher value on voting.  Many 
shareholders never vote in the corporate elections and have little interest in the operation of the 
firm.  In contrast, insiders and large shareholders are often keenly aware of voting issues and 
power structures.  As a result, dual-class recapitalizations with preferred dividend promises to 
low-vote shareholders can be viewed as mechanisms to transfer value in a mutually beneficial 
manner.  DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) find that officers of firms with two classes of common 
stock averaged 54.8% of the voting power but only 27.6% of the claims to cash flows.  Partch 
(1987) reports that insider ownership and voting power was 48.6% before a dual-class 
recapitalization.  Twenty-one months after the event, inside ownership fell to 43.7% while 
insider-voting power rose to 58.6%. 
 In cases where an explicit preferential dividend is promised, low-vote shares are often 
promised 110% of the dividend paid to high-vote shares.  In a limited number of cases, the low-
vote shareholders are promised a fixed amount before the two classes share equally in 
subsequent distributions.  The following promise by Presidio Oil is representative:   
“If cash dividends are paid on Class B Common Stock, a cash dividend must 
also be paid on Class A Common Stock in an amount equal to 110% of the per 
share amount of the cash dividend paid on Class B Common Stock.”     
 
 Other firms promise the low-vote shares at least the same dividend per share as paid to 
the high-vote shares.  This structure allows for the possibility of preferential dividends without 
guaranteeing them.  The following promise by the Alberto Culver Company is typical: 
“Class A and B are entitled to cash dividends, except that no dividends may be 
paid in Class B unless an equal or greater dividend is paid on Class A, and 
dividends may be paid on Class A in excess of dividends paid, or without paying 
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dividends on Class B.” 
 
 Both forms of dividend promises described above are interesting because they offer only 
the potential for preferred dividends to the low-vote shareholders.  Even if a firm promises 
preferred dividends, the firm can pay equal dividends simply by paying no dividends.  Similarly, 
firms that promise at least an equal dividend can avoid paying a preferential dividend by not 
paying dividends at all or by paying equal dividends.  Corporate insiders who determine dividend 
policy tend to concentrate their holdings in the high-vote stock.  Thus, there is a clear incentive 
and opportunity for firms to not fulfill the promise of preferential dividends to the low-vote 
shareholders.   
 In this paper, the relationship between the observed premiums on high-vote shares and 
firm specific variables is investigated to determine the source of the value of corporate control.  
We differentiate between the value of direct control by insiders and the value of indirect control 
by non-insiders.  In addition, the value of preferential dividend promises to low-vote 
shareholders is investigated to determine if voting power can be purchased.   
 
2. Analysis of Average Price Ratios:  
2.1 Data and methodology  
 The sample includes firms with two classes of common stock that traded simultaneously 
on a public exchange within the period 1984 to 1999.  The two stock classes must feature 
unequal voting rights and equal cash flow rights at liquidation.  Unlike some previous studies, 
firms with equal and unequal dividend compensation between classes are included in the sample.  
The 98 firms in the sample are obtained by searching the Center for Research in Security Prices  
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(CRSP) tapes, the Omega Research stock database, and the Daily Stock Price Record books for 
companies with dual listings on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ exchanges.  Information from 
proxy statements is used to remove non-qualifying firms and to determine the form of the 
dividend promise.  
 Annual price ratios are computed for each firm from every year that the firm had two 
stock classes publicly traded within the sample period.  The numerator in the price ratio is the 
closing price of the high-vote stock and the denominator is the closing price of the low-vote 
stock.  If the capital market equally values the two classes of stock then the average ratio should 
not be significantly different from 1.0.  Market prices were collected from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes, the Omega Research stock database, and the Daily 
Stock Price Record books.  Because our sample follows 98 firms across 16 years, and many of 
the stocks that traded on pink sheets had prices that needed to be hand collected, August was 
randomly selected as a sample month to represent each year’s price ratio.  This process results in 
up to 16 observations from each firm and a pooled sample of 839 observations.  Annual price 
ratios are used as independent observations corresponding with the firm specific variables that 
are likely to vary from year to year.  Information such as dividends, insiders' percentage 
ownership, and traditional return measures are collected from required documents that are 
annually reported to the SEC.   
2.2 Results 
 Figure 1 represents the average cross-sectional price ratios by year.  In all 16 years the 
average price ratio is above 1.00 and in 15 of the 16 years the price ratio is above 1.05, clearly 
indicating that shareholders value voting rights.  The price ratios reach a maximum during the 
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late 1980s corresponding to the peak of merger and acquisition activity.     
Figure 1 
Average Cross-Sectional Price Ratios (1984 – 1999) 
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Year
Pr
ic
e 
R
at
io
 
 
 To investigate the impact of possible dividend compensation for inferior voting rights, 
the sample firms are initially grouped into three categories based on the form of dividend 
promise to the low-vote shareholders.  The first category includes 44 firms that promise equal 
dividends per share to each class of common stock.  The second category contains 23 firms that 
promise to pay their low-vote shareholders at least the same dividends per share as paid to the 
high-vote class.  If low-vote shareholders price this promise from insiders, this category should 
exhibit a smaller average voting premium than firms that promise equal dividends.  The third 
category is composed of 31 firms that promise the low-vote class preferential dividends.  Firms 
promising preferential dividends are expected to exhibit the smallest voting premium because 
low-vote shareholders will receive compensation for their inferior voting power if dividends are 
paid.    
 Figure 2 plots the time series of the cross-sectional average price ratios separated by the 
form of the dividend promise.  Firms offering equal dividends generally trade at the highest price 
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ratios and always trade at a higher ratio than firms promising preferred dividends.  As expected, 
firms that promised at least an equal dividend, generally trade at price ratios between the ratios 
of firms that offer equal dividends and firms that promise preferred dividends. 
Figure 2 
Average Cross-Sectional Price Ratios By Dividend Promise 
(1984 – 1999) 
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 Table 1 displays the statistical results of the price ratios for the entire sample and 
grouped by categories based on dividend promises.  Firms that promise equal dividends to both 
classes average an 11.1% annual voting premium, which is much larger than the 5.4% premium 
reported by Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983) for similar U.S. firms from 1940 to 1978, 
but is similar to the 10.5% mean premium reported by Zingales (1995) for dual-class firms from 
1984 to 1990.  The average annual voting premium for firms that promise at least an equal 
dividend is 6.5%.   Firms that promise preferential dividends average a 3.8% premium.   The 
average annual premium for all observations in the sample is 7.7%.  In all cases the means are 
significantly different from 1.0.  In addition, analysis of variance reveals that the mean price 
ratios by category of dividend promise are significantly different from each other at the 1.0% 
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level.  This is in contrast to Zingales (1995) who finds the average premium for companies with 
equal dividend rights is only slightly larger than the mean of his entire sample.     
Table 1 
Average Price Ratios Grouped By the Form of Dividend Promise 
(1984 – 1999) 
 
 
# 
of 
 Firms 
# 
 of Annual 
Observations 
Mean  
Price 
 Ratio 
t-value on 
Difference 
from 1.0 
All Firms 
 
98 839 1.077 12.85** 
Firms that Promise Equal Dividends 
 
44 356 1.111 9.38** 
Firms that Promise at Least an Equal Dividend 
 
23 243 1.065 7.91** 
Firms that Promise a Preferred Dividend  
 
31 240 1.038 5.62** 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
 
Apparently, the low-vote shareholders believe, and therefore price, the promises of preferential 
or potentially preferential dividends.  This result is interesting given that insiders tend to hold the 
high-vote stock and thus appear to lack incentive to pay preferential dividends to the low-vote 
shares.  In fact, they can choose to pay equal dividends to both classes when they promise at 
least an equal dividend, and they can pay no dividends at all when they promise a preferential 
dividend.  We further discuss the issue of dividend promises and look at actual dividend 
behavior in Section 4.   
 
 
3. The Impact of Firm Specific Variables: 
 Although it is well established that voting rights have value, the source of benefits to 
marginal shareholders has not been fully explored.  One benefit to non-insiders of holding high-
vote stock is the possibility of receiving preferential takeover premiums.  However, non-insiders 
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may also benefit by using voting power to exert disciplinary pressure on insiders to improve 
performance without a direct takeover threat.  We use pooled annual data from all firms from 
1984 to 1999 to investigate the impact of firm specific variables on the value of corporate 
control.  In addition to controlling for the form of dividend promise, we measure the impact of: 
the presence of a control threat, differences in liquidity between the stock classes, the relative 
voting power of the high-vote stock, the percentage of insider ownership, and firm performance.  
Equation 1 represents the regression model.   Discussion of the formulation of each variable and 
the expected results are presented in the subsections below.  
Equation 1:   
              = + + + + + + + +α α α ε0 1 2 % %  
3.1 Dividend promises (ATLEAST) (PREFERRED) 
 We control for the form of dividend promise with dummy variables representing the 
promise of at least equal dividends (ATLEAST) and the promise of preferential dividends 
(PREFERRED).  Consistent with the results presented in section 2.2 above, the promise of extra 
cash flow is expected to compensate shareholders for reduced voting power and negatively 
impact the voting premium.   
3.2 Control threats (PLAY)    
 Although most firms promise both stock classes equal distributions during liquidation, 
shareholders may be offered differential premiums in an acquisition.  While some European 
countries prohibit or restrict two tier and differential bids, U.S. laws do not require that a bid for 
controlling shares be extended to all shareholders.  Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1992) develop a 
model of the optimal bid prices for voting and non-voting shares in corporate acquisitions.  The 
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previously documented existence of differential takeover offers suggests that non-insiders may 
be willing to pay a premium for high-vote stock as an option to participate in the profits from 
possible future control contests.  Privately commissioned studies by investment advisors to two 
of our sample firms confirm that preferential payments to the high-vote shares continue to exist 
in recent control contests.  In reports referenced in the sponsoring firms’ proxy statements, Duff 
and Phelps Inc. and Allen and Company Inc. find, on average, that premiums were paid to the 
high-vote shares in 15% of takeovers during the late 1990s.  In addition, they find that premiums 
were paid to the high-vote shares in 40% of reclassifications back to one class of common stock.   
 We test the impact of increased expectations of a takeover on voting premiums.  The 
variable PLAY is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a control threat.  It is constructed 
by using the Dow Jones News Service and LEXIS NEXIS to conduct an electronic search for 
relevant news stories from a wide variety of business sources, including the Wall Street Journal 
and Barrons, for news of actual or rumored control contests within the calendar year before 
each observation.  Specifically, we searched for the key words: takeover, buyout, acquire, and 
tender.  Control contests were liberally defined and many did not result in an actual change of 
control.  In some cases, the takeover pressure came from outside the firm with either a formal 
offer or news that an outsider had acquired a significant block of stock and was considering an 
offer.  In other cases, the pressure came from within the firm as management groups announced 
their intent to obtain greater control and perhaps take the firm private.  PLAY is expected to 
increase the voting premium as the probability of differential cash flows to the high-vote shares 
increases.       
3.3 High-vote voting power (VOTE%) 
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 All firms in the sample have high-vote and low-vote stock.  However, the percentage of 
voting power held by the high-vote shares is different between firms and should be controlled for 
in a regression explaining the voting premium.   The variable is defined as the fraction or 
proportion of the total number of board of directors that is elected by the high-vote 
shareholders.  If the high-vote shareholders are simply given more votes than the low-vote 
shareholders then that ratio is used.   For example, the variable equals 1.0 if the low-vote stock 
has no voting power.  The variable equals 0.9091 (10/11) if the high-vote stock gets ten votes 
while the low-vote stock gets one vote.  The coefficient on this variable is expected to be 
positive as more voting power should result in a greater voting premium.    
3.4 Insider Ownership (INSIDER%)  
 INSIDER% is defined as a dummy variable that equals 1.0 if the total percentage voting 
power of insiders is greater that 40%.  This information was found by examining annual proxy 
statements.  In general, the number reflects the total voting power from the ownership of both 
classes of common stock of all directors and executive officers as a group.  Based on the SEC 
guidelines, it also includes the voting power of individuals and trusts that are related to, or allied 
with, an insider or director.   
 INSIDER% is constructed as a non-linear variable because Jarrell and Poulsen (1988), 
Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1988), and others find a non-linear relationship between 
management ownership and market valuation.   This variable is expected to be negative because 
voting rights have less marginal impact and are worth less when a group of insiders already 
effectively control the firm.  Further discussion of the formulation of this variable and the choice 
of 40% as the cutoff can be found in Section 3.7.       
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3.5 Liquidity  (LIQUIDITY) 
 The price ratio of dual-class stock is generally assumed to be a function of voting power 
and expected cash flows.  However, the price ratio may also reflect differences in the liquidity of 
the two classes of stock.  Beiner and Gibson (1999) argue that liquidity risk affects 
shareholders’ willingness to invest in stocks and should be reflected in their prices.  Megginson 
(1990) finds that low-vote shares are more actively traded than high-vote shares in his study of 
British dual-class firms and Zingales (1995) reports the volume in the high-vote stock is less 
than half the volume of the low-vote stock on average.  In this study, high-vote shares are often 
thinly traded compared to low-vote shares and, on average, the low-vote shares trade at 5.32 
times the volume of the high-vote shares.   
 The LIQUIDITY variable is constructed by subtracting the high-vote volume from the low-
vote volume.  This variable was also constructed as the ratio of the high-vote volume to the low-
vote volume and using logarithmic transformations.  The various specifications of the liquidity 
variable did not change the results significantly so we used the most intuitive definition.  Larger 
values of this variable should result in relatively higher market values for the low-vote stock 
compared to the high-vote stock.  Thus, this variable is expected to have a negative impact on 
the price ratio of the high-vote to the low-vote stock. 
    
3.6 Firm performance (PERFORMANCE) 
Voting rights should have value if they provide the shareholders the opportunity to exert 
pressure that improves performance and increases the value of the future cash flows, even if 
there is not a direct threat of a takeover.  If the value of market discipline increases as a firm’s 
  
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
performance slides, then the price ratio should be negatively correlated to measures of the firm’s 
profitability.  To test this hypothesis, the PERFORMANCE variable is constructed in three ways 
using data from the Compustat database (Research Insight).  First, the Return on Total Assets 
(ROA) is calculated for each firm from each sample year.  ROA measures the performance of 
management given the assets that are in place without regard to how they were financed.  If this 
number is lower, then the value of the vote and the option to intervene should be higher.  The 
variable is also constructed using the Return on Total Equity (ROE) which measures the 
performance of the firm given the amount of shareholder investment.  Again, the lower the 
number the greater the need for market discipline and the greater the expected value of the vote.  
Finally, PERFORMANCE is constructed using the actual return on common stock from the sample 
year.  The return on the common stock includes the dividend yield, if any.  An inverse 
relationship is expected between a firm’s stock performance and the value of corporate control.  
3.7 Results 
 Pearson correlation coefficients calculated between each of the independent variables 
show no significant correlations and hence, no potential problems with multicollinearity.  The 
results from the ordinary least squares regression represented by Equation 1 are presented in 
Table 2.  Three regression results are shown, each using a different measure of PERFORMANCE. 
 Earlier we reported that the form of the dividend promise effectively reduced the voting 
premium by allowing insiders to purchase some of the value of the vote.  Those results are 
confirmed here as the coefficients for ATLEAST and PREFERRED are significantly negative.  
Promising at least an equal dividend to the low-vote shareholders reduces the voting premium by 
approximately 3% while promising preferred dividends reduces the premium by over 7%.       
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 The PLAY variable, which directly tests whether the possibility of a takeover affects the 
voting premium, is positive and highly significant.  In fact, the coefficient indicates that the 
presence of a control threat increases the voting premium by more than 23%.  Thus, the 
possibility of a takeover premium provides strong incentive for outside shareholders to pay a 
premium for high-vote shares even when they have no interest in actual control of the firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
OLS Regression Results Explaining the Annual Price Ratios of the High-Vote Stock 
Divided by the Low-Vote Stock for 98 firms from 1984-1999 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Intercept 1.058 
(22.65)
**
 
1.063 
(22.53)** 
1.070 
(22.62)** 
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ATLEAST -0.030 
(-2.34)
**
 
-0.033 
(-2.44)** 
-0.035 
(-2.53)** 
PREFERRED -0.076 
(-5.69)** 
-0.072 
(-5.37)** 
-0.074 
(-5.45)** 
PLAY 0.233 
(13.48)** 
0.237 
(13.62)** 
0.243 
(13.94)** 
VOTE% 
 
0.063 
(1.26) 
0.047 
(0.93) 
0.043 
(0.86) 
INSIDER% -0.029 
(-2.62)
**
 
-0.030 
(-2.68)** 
-0.030 
(-2.63)** 
LIQUIDITY -1.319E-08 
(-1.37) 
-1.031E-08 
(-1.06) 
-0.856E-08 
(-0.88) 
PERFORMANCE 
(ROA) 
-0.003 
(-4.98)
**
 
  
PERFORMANCE 
(ROE) 
 -8.542E-05 
(-2.72)** 
 
PERFORMANCE 
(Return on Stock) 
  -2.955E-04 
(-2.17)** 
Adjusted R2 .234 
 
.218 .215 
F Value 37.68** 
 
34.51** 34.02** 
Observations 839 
 
839 839 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
 
This table reports the results of the following equation: 
 
              = + + + + + + + +α α α ε0 1 2 % %  
 
where, 
 
RATIO is the price of the high-vote stock divided by the price of the low-vote stock for the sampled trading day. 
ATLEAST is a dummy variable that equals 1.0 if a firm promises at least equal dividends to low-vote shares. 
PREFERRED is a dummy variable that equals 1.0 if a firm promises preferential dividends to low-vote shares. 
PLAY is a dummy variable that equals 1.0 if there is evidence of a control issue during the sample year. 
VOTE% is the percentage of voting control held by the high-vote shares. 
INSIDER% is the percentage of total voting power held by corporate insiders.   
LIQUIDITY is the trading volume of the low-vote shares minus the trading volume of the high-vote shares. 
PERFORMANCE is the sample firms’ economic performance measured by ROA, ROE, and Return on Stock. 
 
  The VOTE% variable is positive as expected but not statistically significant.  In most cases 
the high-vote shares carry sufficient voting power to assure that control of the firm will come 
through that class of stock.  Thus, it is not surprising that the relative voting proportion of the 
high-vote stock does not add significant additional explanatory power in predicting the level of 
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the voting premium.     
 The INSIDER% variable is significant and negative indicating that when insiders control at 
least 40% of the voting power firms exhibit lower voting premiums.  This variable is also 
significant if the dummy variable is defined at any point between 30% and 55%.  This result is 
consistent with the non-linear relationship between corporate value and insider ownership 
reported by McConnell and Servaes (1990).   In contrast, Megginson (1990) finds that the 
voting premium is positively and linearly related to insider holdings of high-vote shares in British 
firms.  In our sample, when INSIDER% is expressed as a linear variable the coefficient is not 
significant.     
 The LIQUIDITY variable is negative as predicted, but it is not statistically significant.  The 
economic significance of this coefficient is also rather small.  These results agree with those of 
Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (1984), Zingales (1995), and Chung and Kim (1999).  If 
anything, liquidity concerns result in understated voting premiums.   
 The PERFORMANCE variable is significantly negative in each of its three specifications.  
ROA is the most significant and, arguably, the best measure of short-term management 
performance.  ROE is a function of long-term financing decisions, and the return on the stock is 
influenced by overall market conditions and fluctuations.  All variable specifications are also 
significant when the values are lagged by one year.  Poor firm performance clearly increases the 
value of corporate control.  It should be noted that the impact of these PERFORMANCE variables 
is statistically significant even with the presence of the PLAY variable in the same regression.  
This suggests that the value of corporate control and market discipline includes more than the 
direct threat of a takeover.  High-vote shares have an option that low-vote shares do not: a 
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potential real impact on how the business is run which is particularly valuable when performance 
declines. 
 
4. Preferential dividend promises and payments 
 The previous sections of this paper document that preferential dividend promises are 
priced by shareholders and thus, reduce the price ratios between dual-classes of common stock.  
This result raises three fundamental questions.  First, why do insiders promise preferential 
dividends to low-vote shareholders?  Second, why do low-vote shareholders believe that 
preferential dividends will be paid?  Third, do firms actually pay preferential dividends? 
 These questions arise because insiders appear to have the ability and the incentive to 
withhold dividends or choose not to pay preferential dividends.  Insiders tend to hold the high-
vote, low-dividend class of shares.  If preferential dividends are offered and paid to the low-vote 
shares, insiders receive a disproportionately lower amount of the proceeds.  In contrast, a zero 
dividend policy allows insiders to share at least equally in increases in firm value.   
4.1 Statistical analysis   
 The dividend variables used in this section represent the impact of actual dividends as 
well as dividend promises.  We examine actual dividend payments because both forms of 
preferential dividend promises allow managers to avoid paying higher dividends to the low-vote 
shareholders by not paying any dividends or by paying equal dividends when at least equal 
dividends are promised.  Actual dividend payments may help to resolve uncertainty and reflect 
the true dividend intentions of management. 
 Table 3 shows that in 55% of the annual observations when firms in our sample promised 
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a preferred dividend, they actually did pay a higher dividend to the low-vote shares.  When at 
least an equal dividend was promised, a higher dividend was actually paid in 30% of the cases.  
Overall, the incremental dividend yield averaged only about one half of one percent.   
 Table 3 
Actual Dividend Policy by Firms that Promise the Possibility 
of Preferential Dividends from 1984–1999 
 
 
#  
of 
 Firms 
#  
of Annual 
Observations 
Actually Pay 
Preferential 
Dividends 
Preferential 
Dividend 
Yield 
Firms that Promise at Least an Equal Dividend 
 
23 243 73 (30%) .55% 
Firms that Promise a Preferred Dividend  
 
31 240 132 (55%) .46% 
 
 Actual preferential dividends cannot be directly added as explanatory variables to our 
previous regression, without causing statistical problems, because this would also capture the 
form of the dividend promise since only firms that promise preferential dividends can pay them.  
Instead, we construct interactive variables that reflect both the relative size of the preferential 
dividend and the related dividend promise.  DIVIDEND YIELD (ATLEAST) and DIVIDEND YIELD 
(PREFERRED) are calculated by first taking the difference of the low-vote dividend minus the 
high-vote dividend divided by the average market price of the two stock classes.  Then, the 
preferential dividend yield is multiplied by the dummy variable (ATLEAST or PREFERRED) that 
indicates the form of the firm’s dividend promise.  This technique allows measuring whether the 
payment of preferential dividends offers explanatory power beyond the promise. 
 We also take a less sophisticated approach by omitting the dummy variables, ATLEAST 
and PREFERRED, and simply using a DIVIDEND YIELD variable calculated by taking the difference 
of the low-vote dividend minus the high-vote dividend divided by the average market price.  
Finally, we try a DIVIDEND DUMMY variable that equals one if preferential dividends are paid and 
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zero otherwise.  These variables simultaneously reflect the promise and the payment of 
preferential dividends. 
 The regression results in Table 4 show that the variables reflecting actual preferential 
dividend payments beyond the promise of preferential dividends are not significant.  However, 
the variables representing the promises remain significant.  When the variables representing the 
promises are omitted, DIVIDEND DUMMY is significantly negative but DIVIDEND YIELD is not.   
These results indicate that it is the promise of preferential dividends rather than their actual 
payment that lowers the premium on the high-vote shares. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
OLS Regression Results Adding Actual Dividend Behavior  
to Explain the Annual Price Ratios of the High-Vote Stock Divided  
by the Low-Vote Stock for 98 firms from 1984-1999 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Intercept 1.059 
(22.52)** 
0.972 
(22.69)** 
0.986 
(22.87)** 
ATLEAST -0.030 
(-2.18)** 
  
PREFERRED -0.079 
(-5.57)** 
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PLAY 0.233 
(13.46)** 
0.229 
(13.03)** 
0.229 
(13.03)** 
VOTE% 
 
0.062 
(1.22) 
0.133 
(2.75)** 
0.121 
(2.51)** 
INSIDER% -0.029 
(-2.60)** 
-0.034 
(-3.00)** 
-0.033 
(-2.86) 
LIQUIDITY -1.303E-08 
(-1.35) 
-1.209E-08 
(-1.24) 
-1.244E-08 
(-1.27) 
PERFORMANCE (ROA) -0.003 
(4.90)** 
-0.003 
(4.51)** 
-0.003 
(4.39)** 
DIVIDEND YIELD (ATLEAST) -0.321 
(-0.53) 
  
DIVIDEND YIELD (PREFERRED) 0.674 
(0.60) 
  
DIVIDEND YIELD 
 
 -0.499 
(-0.92) 
 
DIVIDEND DUMMY 
 
  -0.027 
(-2.09)** 
Adjusted R2 
 
.232 .206 .209 
F Value 
 
29.33** 37.33** 38.07** 
Observations 
 
839 839 839 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
 
This table reports the results of the equation used in Table2 with the following additional variables considered: 
 
DIVIDEND YIELD (ATLEAST) = {ATLEAST X (low-vote dividend - high-vote dividend)}/{(high-vote price + 
low-vote price)/2} 
DIVIDEND YIELD (PREFERRED) = {PREFERRED X (low-vote dividend - high-vote dividend)}/{(high-vote 
price + low-vote price)/2} 
DIVIDEND YIELD = (low-vote dividend - high-vote dividend)/{(high-vote price + low-vote price)/2} 
DIVIDEND DUMMY = 1.0 if preferential dividends are paid and 0 if equal or no dividends are paid 
 
 
 
4.2 Discussion  
 Insiders promise preferential dividends to low-vote shares because they must expect to 
benefit from the promise.  Specifically, insiders benefit from a dual-class recapitalization through 
greater voting power with constant or decreased equity investment.  The promise of preferential 
dividends encourages approval of the recapitalization and promotes subsequent conversion of 
high-vote shares to low-vote shares.  In addition, insiders may promise preferential dividends 
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because they anticipate issuing low-vote equity following the recapitalization and have incentive 
to support the market price of the stock.   
 The pricing of preferential dividend promises depends on non-insiders believing that it is 
in the best interests of insiders to follow through with their promise.  Paying preferential 
dividends to the low-vote shares will facilitate subsequent issues of low-vote equity providing a 
positive signal that increases firm value.  Also, many firms recapitalize to two classes of common 
stock because the personal wealth constraints and/or diversification concerns of insiders often 
prevent them from maintaining or increasing their ownership share.  The payment of cash 
dividends is an effective strategy for withdrawing value from the firm without reducing voting 
power.  Thus, when non-insiders perceive that insiders have the incentive to pay dividends, then 
the promise of preferential dividends to low-vote shares is more credible.    
 Our regression results from Table 4 show that it is the promise of preferential dividends 
rather than their actual payment that lowers the voting premium.  Dual-class recapitalizations 
may be viewed as transactions that harm non-insiders by insulating management.  Alternatively, 
dual-class recapitalizations may allow firms to access positive net present value projects by 
issuing additional capital without insiders losing voting control.  Firms that recapitalize to 
increase firm value have the incentive to signal that motivation.  A preferential dividend promise 
is more credible when future profits are expected, and may serve as an effective signal of 
insiders’ positive intentions.  Thus, our results indicate that the signal of the promise may 
dominate any resolution of uncertainty when preferential dividends are actually paid.     
  
5. Summary  
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 This paper examines the relative pricing of the high and low-vote shares of 98 firms with 
two classes of common stock trading in the U.S. during the period from 1984 to 1999.  Ratios 
of the market prices of high to low-vote stock are used to measure the value of the vote.  The 
observed voting premiums are higher than those reported in previous studies of U.S. firms and 
are highly dependent on the form of dividend promise to the low-vote shareholders. 
 The relationship between the observed premiums on high-vote shares and firm specific 
variables is investigated to determine the source of the value of corporate control.  Preferential 
dividend promises to low-vote shareholders reduce the voting premium, providing evidence that 
voting power can be priced and purchased with higher dividends.  Results indicate that it is the 
signaling effect from the promise of preferential dividends, rather than their actual payment, that 
lowers the premium on the high-vote shares.  The presence of a control threat significantly 
increases the voting premium indicating that the option to participate in a takeover premium may 
induce non-insiders to pay a higher price for high-vote shares.  The voting premium also 
increases with poor firm performance and when insiders do not hold controlling voting power.  
This indicates that the option to exercise control to discipline managers to improve performance 
is most valuable when a firm is under performing and when voting rights have potential marginal 
impact.  Voting rights have value if they provide shareholders the opportunity to exert pressure 
that improves performance and increases the value of future cash flows, even in the absence of a 
direct threat of a takeover.
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